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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS.
HOMESTEAD. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for their residence and the 58 acres of land on
which it was located. The property was located within the
city limits and consisted of the house, a barn and other
farm buildings, and open land used for crop production and
pasturing horses. The property was not platted but was
surrounded by residential properties of normal size for city
dwellings. The debtors had sold a portion of the property
which was converted to a residential subdivision. The
property was not surrounded by residential properties when
purchased 35 years ago and the debtors had used the
property continuously, except for the sold portion, as a
farm. The court held that, under state law, the debtors’ 58
acre property retained its character as rural farm property
eligible for the rural homestead exemption of up to 120
acres. In re Becker, 215 B.R. 585 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 1998),
aff’g, 212 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997).
VENUE. The plaintiff originally owned a farm but lost
the farm to foreclosure. The plaintiff’s parents purchased
the farm from the lender, with the plaintiff contributing
part of the downpayment and making all future loan
payments. The parents lived in California and filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. After that case was closed, the
plaintiff filed a suit in Michigan court to have the farm
reconveyed to the plaintiff. The parents obtained a
reopening of their case in Michigan Bankruptcy Court and
removed the case to that court, with the intent to further
remove the case to California Bankruptcy Court. The
Michigan Bankruptcy Court did not rule on the proper
court for the suit because the parties had not provided
sufficient briefs on the issues. The court discussed the
various removal issues: (1) did the Michigan Bankruptcy
Court, which was not the original court of the bankruptcy
case, have any jurisdiction over a proceeding ancillary to
the original bankruptcy case and (2) did equity favor
inconveniencing the parents or the plaintiff? The parties
were ordered to submit briefs on the issues raised by the
court. Cook v. Cook, 215 B.R. 975 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The debtor filed for
Chapter 13 in March 1995 and the case was eventually
converted to Chapter 7. The IRS filed an administrative
expense claim for employment taxes due for the first
quarter of 1995 and interest and penalties which accrued on
the taxes. The debtors argued that interest on post-petition
taxes was not an administrative expense. The court held
that interest on post-petition taxes was an administrative
expense. In re Iannolo, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,279 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1998).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS filed a Notice of Levy
against the debtor’s bank account on May 1, 1996. On May
7, 1996, the debtor filed under Chapter 7 before the levy
was executed. The levy was executed by the bank on May
21, 1996 without knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and
the trustee sought recovery of the levied funds as violating
the automatic stay. The court held (1) the account funds
were property of the estate when the levy was executed, (2)
the IRS had no duty to inform the bank of the bankruptcy
filing, (3) the IRS did not violate the automatic stay in
refusing to return the levied funds, and (4) the funds could
not be recovered until the IRS was adequately protected on
its tax claims. In re Quality Health Care, 215 B.R. 543
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The debtors owned a personal
residence but only the husband’s name was on the title to
the property. The debtors had equity in the residence and
both claimed a homestead exemption. After the exempt
amount, only a small amount of equity remained. The
debtors had $70,000 of income tax basis in the residence
and the sale of the residence would produce $12,000 in tax
on the gain realized from the sale of the property. The
debtors sought abandonment of the property by the trustee
because, after the two exemptions and payment of the
capital gains tax, no proceeds of a sale would be available
for creditors. The trustee argued that the wife was not
entitled to an exemption because her name was not on the
title. The trustee also argued that the sale of the residence
was eligible for the exclusion of gain provision in the Tax
Relief Act of 1997 (See 8 Agric. L. Digest, 113 (1997)).
The court held that, under Illinois law, the wife was not
entitled to an exemption because the wife had no
ownership interest. The court held that the rights of spouses
created by the Rights of Married Women Act did not create
an interest sufficient to entitle the wife to an exemption.
The court also ruled that the sale of the residence would be
eligible for the 1997 Act exclusion; therefore, sufficient
proceeds from a sale remained after the husband’s
exemption to pay creditors and the property could not be
abandoned. In re Popa, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,276 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
CONTRACTS
GOOD FAITH. The plaintiff operated a swine
breeding operation and contracted with the defendant for
the purchase of new breeding stock from 1989 through
1994. The purchase contracts contained language that the
defendant did not guarantee that the breeding stock did not
have any pathogens or disease and that the defendant's
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liability was limited to replacement of defective swine. The
contract also contained language that the contract
contained all agreements between the parties, either written
or oral. The plaintiff discovered in 1993 that some of the
swine provided by the defendant were infected with
Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS);
however, the plaintiff accepted new deliveries of the
defendant's swine. The plaintiff alleged that an agent of the
defendant orally warranted that the defendant's swine were
free of PRRS and that this oral statement was an actionable
fraud on the plaintiff. The court held that, given the clear
contract language that the contract represented the sole
agreement between the parties, any reliance by the plaintiff
on the oral statement of the agent was not reasonable. The
plaintiff also argued that the selling of PRRS infected
swine violated the general duty of good faith by the
defendant. The court held that the clear language of the
contract specifically assigned the risk of disease to the
plaintiff and limited the defendant's liability to replacement
of diseased swine. Rayle Tech, Inc. v. Dekalb Swine
Breeders, 133 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998), aff’g, 897 F.
Supp. 1472 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued interim
regulations amending the brucellosis regulations
concerning the  interstate movement of cattle by changing
the classification of Florida from Class A to Class Free. 63
Fed. Reg. 14335 (March 25, 1998).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations which change the 1997 contract change date for
counties and states with a contract change date of
November 30 to a contract change date of December 17,
1997. The change affects insurance provisions of the
General Crop Insurance Regulations; Canning and
Processing Tomato and Rice Endorsements; Fresh Market
Tomato (Guaranteed Production Plan) Crop Insurance
Regulations; and the Common Crop Insurance Regulations
for Cotton, Coarse Grains (Corn, Grain Sorghum, and
Soybeans), Dry Bean, ELS Cotton, Sugar Beets, and
Sunflower Seed Crop Insurance Provisions. 63 Fed. Reg.
14333 (March 25, 1997).
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The plaintiffs operated a fish
farm near the Mississippi river which was destroyed by
floods in 1993. The plaintiffs applied for disaster funds
under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Relief from Major, Widespread Flooding in the Midwest,
Pub. L. No. 103-75, 107 Stat. 739 (1993) (1993 Act). The
plaintiffs’ application was denied on the grounds that
aquaculture crops were not covered by the 1993 Act. The
plaintiffs argued that the 1993 Act definition of crop was
governed by the 1990 Farm Bill which included
aquaculture as an eligible crop for disaster relief. The 1990
Farm Bill included specified crops, crops for which crop
insurance was available and “other commercial crops.” The
plaintiffs first argued that aquaculture was a covered crop
because, under 7 U.S.C. § 1518 federal crop insurance was
authorized for acquaculture. The court found, however, that
the FCIC had declined to exercise its authority and did not
provide crop insurance for aquaculture; therefore,
aquaculture was not a covered crop under the crop
insurance provision. The court held that aquaculture was
not a covered crop under the “other commercial crop”
provision because the examples under that definition
included only plant crops. The court noted that a
subsequent law specifically added aquaculture to its
coverage, indicating that Congress knew that the 1990
Farm Bill did not include aquaculture in the covered crops.
Petzoldt v. Glickman, 983 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
EGGS. The AMS is amending the regulations governing
the voluntary shell egg grading program. The revisions
require that scales of stated precision be provided to the
grader; provide an alternative grademark for shell eggs;
provide for the use of a ``Produced From'' grademark to
officially identify products that originate from officially
graded shell eggs; and remove the requirement for
continuous overflow of water during the egg washing
process. 63 Fed. Reg. 13329 (March 19, 1998).
TOBACCO. The plaintiff was found to have sold
315,000 more pounds of tobacco than the plaintiff reported
purchasing in 1985-88. The plaintiff was charged with
criminal fraud but was acquitted. The USDA then assessed
the plaintiff a penalty for marketing tobacco in excess of
the plaintiff’s quota. The plaintiff argued that the
assessment violated the double jeopardy and excessive
fines clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that
the assessment did not put the plaintiff in jeopardy a
second time for the same offense because the failure to pay
the marketing quota penalty was not an element of the
fraud charges. The court also held that the double jeopardy
clause was not violated because the assessment was a civil
penalty and not a second criminal punishment. The court
also held that the assessment did not violate the excessive
fines clause because the assessment was remedial in nature.
Cole v. USDA, 133 F.3d 803 (11th Cir. 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent had
established a trust with a charity as the remainder holder.
The decedent had given a daughter a power of attorney
over all assets, including the trust and the daughter changed
the remainder holder to a niece of the decedent. The charity
brought an action to enforce the original trust, claiming
undue influence. The parties settled the case with the
charity receiving a portion of the original remainder
interest. The IRS held that the amount passing to the
charity was eligible for the charitable deduction as
resulting from a bona fide negotiated agreement. Ltr. Rul.
9812014, Dec. 12, 1997.
DISCLAIMER. The decedent died intestate, because the
decedent’s will could not be found, and the surviving
spouse and the decedent’s father decided to take the
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decedent’s estate under the provisions of the prior will.
Property which passed to the father under the state laws of
inheritance was renounced by the father in a written
irrevocable and unqualified statement. The spouse
executed a trust in which all of the decedent’s farm
property passed. Under the trust, the farm property was
operated as it had been when the decedent was alive, as a
partnership with the father. Therefore, the disclaimed
property passed to the spouse’s trust. A short time later, the
trust and the father exchanged properties so that the
father’s property was all in one county near the father’s
residence. The IRS argued that the disclaimer was not
effective because the father received consideration or other
value in exchange for the disclaimer. The court found that
the transactions were all separate and not made in
exchange for each other. The disclaimer was made in order
to remove the decedent’s property from the father’s estate
and the trust was formed to maintain the decedent’s
business operations. The estate was eligible for a marital
deduction for the disclaimed property which passed to the
trust for the surviving spouse. Estate of Lute v. United
States, No: 8:CV97-00118, (D. Neb. March 11, 1998).
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  The taxpayer established an
irrevocable trust for the taxpayer’s child. The trust granted
the trustee the discretionary power to distribute income and
principal to the beneficiary for the beneficiary’s health,
education and support. The beneficiary also had the right to
withdraw any contributions to the trust within 30 days after
notification from the trustee of the new contribution. The
trust was funded with S corporation stock. The IRS ruled
that the beneficiary would be considered the owner of the
trust, making the trust an eligible QSST. The IRS also
ruled that, given no understanding that the beneficiary
would not exercise the withdrawal right, the contributions
to the trust would be eligible for the annual exclusion. Ltr.
Rul. 9812006, Nov. 6, 1997.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent's will left property in trust to the decedent's
spouse but the trust provided that the trustees, the
decedent's sons, had absolute discretion for distributions
from the trust to the surviving spouse. The executor of the
decedent's estate petitioned the state probate court for an
amendment of the trust to provide that all of the trust's net
income be distributed to the surviving spouse at least
annually. The probate court issued an order so amending
the trust. The executor then filed the estate tax return and
claimed the trust as QTIP. The court held that the state
court order was not binding for federal estate tax purposes
and was contrary to the clear language of the trust;
therefore, the trust did not qualify as QTIP because all of
the net annual income was not required to be distributed to
the spouse. Estate of Rapp v. Comm'r, 98-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,304 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’g, T.C. Memo.
1996-10.
The decedent’s will provided for passing of the residuary
estate to a marital trust and a credit shelter trust. The
marital trust was to include as much estate property as
would reduce the estate tax to zero. The executor was also
directed to divide the marital trust into a GSTT-exempt and
a GSTT-nonexempt trust. The GSTT-exempt trust was to
receive as much property as allowed under the GSTT
exemption. The estate tax return identified the assets
eligible for the marital deduction but did not specifically
make the QTIP election. In addition, the return did not
make any reverse QTIP election for the GSTT-exempt
trust. the estate applied for an extension to properly file the
elections. The IRS ruled that the marital trust was eligible
for the marital deduction and that an extension of time was
allowed for filing the reversed QTIP. However, the IRS
ruled that the allocation of the GSTT exemption would be
made under the automatic allocation rules because the
filing period for the allocation election was set by statute.
Ltr. Rul. 9813013, Dec. 19, 1997.
PENSION PLANS. The decedent had owned an interest
in a qualified pension plan in which the designated
remainder beneficiary was a trust established for the
decedent’s spouse. The spouse was the sole trustee and
beneficiary of the trust and had the power to revoke the
trust and receive all trust assets and income. After the
pension plan funds were transferred to the trust, the spouse
caused the funds to be transferred to an IRA in the spouse’s
name. The IRS ruled that, because the spouse had complete
control over the trust, the transfer of the pension plan
would be treated as made directly to the spouse and the
funds would not be included in the spouse’s income. Ltr.
Rul. 9813018, Dec. 30, 1997.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The taxpayer was a
beneficiary of a 1935 trust and had a general power of
appointment over trust principal. The taxpayer proposed to
release a portion of the power such that the taxpayer could
only appoint trust principal to the taxpayer’s estate and the
appointment could take affect only after the death of the
taxpayer. The IRS ruled that (1) the release of a portion of
the power was not considered an exercise of the general
power, (2) the release did not create a new power of
appointment, (3) the release did not subject the trust to
GSTT, and (4) the release did not start the nine month
period for making disclaimers of interests in the trust. Ltr.




EMPLOYMENT TAXES. The taxpayer owned 48
percent of the stock in a closely-held corporation, with the
other shareholder owning 49 percent of the stock. Three
percent of the stock was not issued. The taxpayer served as
a director and as vice-president and secretary. The taxpayer
performed purchasing and inventory services for the
corporation. The corporation ceased operations after
becoming insolvent and had unpaid FICA employment
taxes. The taxpayer knew the taxes were unpaid but argued
that the taxpayer relied on the other shareholder, who was
president and treasurer, to make the tax payments. The IRS
assessed the “responsible person” 100 percent penalty
against the taxpayer and other shareholder, under I.R.C. §
6672 which assessed the penalty on responsible persons
who willfully fail to pay the taxes. The court found that the
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taxpayer (1) was a major shareholder, officer and employee
of the corporation; (2) had the authority to and did sign
corporate checks; (3) helped obtain financing for the
corporation; (4) made deposits for the corporation, (5)
reviewed the corporate financial records; and (6) at least
once authorized payroll checks. The court held that the
taxpayer was a responsible person in the corporation. The
court also held that the taxpayer willfully failed to pay the
employment taxes because the taxpayer unreasonably
relied on the other shareholder to make the payments. The
taxpayer’s actions were unreasonable because the taxpayer
knew the corporation was in financial trouble and failed to
verify that the employment taxes were being paid at a time
when the taxpayer was continuing to receive salary
payments from the corporation. Kelver v. United States,
984 F. Supp. 1352 (D. Colo. 1997).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer, an accountant,
claimed depreciation of cattle for 1988 and 1989. The only
evidence provided to support the deduction was a check
with a notation that the check was a deposit for 37 cows.
The taxpayer had no record of a depreciation schedule, cost
basis or other accounting for the animals and presented no
evidence that the cattle was used for breeding or dairy
purposes. The depreciation deduction was denied.
Wilkerson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-68.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. In June 1985, the
IRS sent the taxpayers, husband and wife, a notice of
deficiency for 1980 and 1981. The taxpayers appealed the
notice in the Tax Court and lost. In April 1984, when the
taxpayer’s liabilities exceeded their assets, the taxpayers
formed a corporation and transferred all farm property to
the corporation in exchange for all stock. The taxpayers
then transferred the stock to their children. The taxpayers
claimed that the transfers were in exchange for farm labor
provided by the children. The children were 9, 12 and 14
when they received the first stock and 11, 14 and 16 when
they received the rest of the stock. The taxpayers and
children had not executed any written agreement
exchanging the services for the stock and under New York
law, parents had a right to the services of their children.
The court held that the transfers of stock to the children,
when the taxpayers were insolvent, were fraudulent
conveyances and the stock was subject to the tax lien
securing the 1980 and 1981 tax assessments. United States
v. Hansel, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,293 (N.D.
N.Y. 1998).
FUEL TAX. The taxpayer purchased undyed diesel fuel
while the taxable fuel was located within a bulk terminal
system. Because the taxpayer was not a taxable fuel
registrant at the time of the purchase, tax was imposed on
the sale of the fuel to the taxpayer. The taxpayer later
registered with the IRS as a taxable fuel registrant. The
taxpayer was the position holder with respect to the fuel
when the taxable fuel was removed from the terminal at the
terminal rack. When the taxpayer filed its excise tax return
for the quarter in which the removals occurred, it did not
report the taxable fuel nor pay the tax on the fuel. The
taxpayer argued that, as a registrant, it would not have had
to pay the first tax on the fuel; therefore, because it did pay
the first tax, it did not need to pay the second tax. The IRS
ruled that the only procedure for avoiding double tax on the
fuel was to pay both taxes and file for a refund for the
second tax. In addition, the IRS ruled that the taxpayer
could not pay only the interest on the second tax for the
period between the normal payment date and the date of a
refund. Ltr. Rul. 9813002, Oct. 29, 1997.
INCOME AVERAGING. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. Senate indefinitely extending
income tax averaging for farmers. The provision is
scheduled to expire after December 31, 2000. S. 1879.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE. The taxpayers owned two
residential rental properties and entered into
accommodation agreements with a broker to sell the
properties in exchange for new property. The agreement
required the identification of replacement properties within
45 days after the sale of the original properties and
purchase of the replacement property within 180 days. The
original properties were sold in February 1993 and the
taxpayers identified three potential exchange properties
within 45 days. The first property negotiations fell through,
the second property sale was canceled by the seller and the
third property was purchased in December 1993, more than
180 days after the sale of the original properties. The
taxpayers argued that they made a good faith effort to
comply with the 180 requirement of I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B)
but were prevented by the seller’s cancellation of the
second sale. The court held that the statutory requirement
was clear and contained no good faith exception to the 180
day requirement. The taxpayers were not allowed like-kind
exchange treatment for the sale of the original properties.
Knight v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-107.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
CONTRIBUTIONS. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
formed a limited partnership and contributed cash in
exchange for partnership interests. The husband transferred
stock to the wife such that both taxpayers held the same
proportion of stock as their partnership interests. The
taxpayers contributed their stock to the partnership. The
partnership business was investing in marketable securities.
The taxpayers made gifts of less than 5 percent interests in
the partnership to their two children. The IRS ruled that the
partnership was not an investment company under I.R.C. §
351; therefore, under I.R.C. § 721(b), the transfers of stock
to the partnership did not cause recognition of loss or gain.
Ltr. Rul. 9811022, Dec. 4, 1997.
PAYMENT OF WAGES IN-KIND. The taxpayer was
a family-owned corporation which purchased another
corporation. The taxpayer transferred the acquired
corporation’s stock to the taxpayer’s employees as
compensation for services. However, the taxpayer did not
withhold any taxes from the transfer or issue any Forms W-
2 or 1099 to the employees and the employees did not
include the value of the stock in gross income. The court
held that, under I.R.C. § 83, the taxpayer could not deduct
the value of the stock as a wage expense. Venture
Funding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. No. 19 (1998).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in March 1998,
the weighted average is 6.71 percent with the permissible
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range of 6.04 to 7.11 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.04 to 7.38 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
98-9, I.R.B. 1998-4, 8.
The taxpayer received a large distribution from a
qualified pension plan which was rolled over to another
plan but the taxpayer was still eligible for monthly
payments from the first plan. The court held that the
distribution was not a lump sum distribution eligible for
10-year averaging because the distribution was not a
complete payment of the taxpayer’s interest in the plan.
Scallion v. United States, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,284 (D. Md. 1998); Miller v. United States, 98-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,285 (D. Md. 1998).
RELOCATION PAYMENTS. The taxpayer received
payments, under the Housing and Community
Development Act, for defraying expenses from moving
from a flood damaged residence to a new residence. The
IRS ruled that the payments were in the form of
governmental general welfare payments excluded from
income of the taxpayer. See also Rev. Rul. 76-373, 1976-2
C.B. 16. Rev. Rul. 98-19, I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued updated requirements
and procedures for magnetic and electronic filing of Form
W-4, Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate. Rev.
Proc. 98-26, I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer was
an S corporation which owned several commercial
properties. The taxpayer provided substantial services to
the properties, either directly or through a separate
management company. The IRS ruled that the rental
income from the properties was income from an active
trade or business of renting property and was not passive
investment income. Ltr. Rul. 9813011, Dec. 18, 1997.
TERMINATION. A trust acquired S corporation stock
and filed a QSST election which contained the wrong
employer identification number (EIN) for the trust. It was
also discovered that the trust did not qualify as a QSST
because the trust contained a provision allowing the
beneficiary to appoint all or part of the trust principal to the
grantor’s children. The trust was reformed to remove this
provision. The IRS ruled that the termination of the S
corporation status was inadvertent. Ltr. Rul. 9809056,
Dec. 3, 1997.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRODUCTION INPUT LIEN. The debtor was a farmer
who had borrowed from the defendant bank. The bank was
granted a security interest in the farmer’s property and the
security interest was perfected. The farmer obtained feed
on credit from the plaintiff and the plaintiff filed with the
bank a notification of agricultural input lien, listing the lien
amount at $65,000 and the transaction dates as between
July 15, 1995 and November 15, 1995. The defendant
received the notification but did not respond to it, thus
giving the plaintiff a priority lien for $65,000 under Minn.
Stat. §§ 514.950 - 514.959. The plaintiff, however, actually
provided the farmer with $73,748 in feed during the dates
listed and the farmer paid on the account during that period
such that the debt stood at $44,682 when the farmer
liquidated the farm. The plaintiff argued that the lien
protected a revolving line of credit of up to $65,000
regardless of the payments made by the farmer so that the
entire $44,682 was covered by the lien. The bank argued
that only $65,000 of the total amount supplied on credit,
less the amounts paid by the farmer, was subject to the lien.
The court held that the statute required the notification to
state the retail cost of anticipated cost of the production
inputs to be provided; therefore, the notification
statement’s listing of $65,000 set the total limit on the
inputs covered by the lien. The court also noted that if the
supplier provides more than the notification amount, the
statute provided for amendment of the notification to
provide for priority for the additional amount. Because the
plaintiff did not file an amended notification, the lien
covered only $65,000 of the feed less the amounts paid on
the debt by the farmer. Tracy State Bank v. Tracy-Gavin
Co-op., 573 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY. The taxpayers owned
rural property which had received “Green Acres” special
use valuation for real property tax purposes for several
years under Minn. Stat. § 273.121. During that time, the
special use value and the fair market value were similar for
real estate tax purposes. In March 1995, the taxpayers
received notice of a substantial increase in the fair market
value of the property for real estate tax purposes, although
the property was still assessed for taxes at the “Green
Acres” rate. The taxpayers, however, had not received any
notice, required by Minn. Stat. § 273.121, that the property
was going to be subject to a new assessment or
reclassification. However, the taxpayers did not appeal the
new fair market value until they sold the property for a
price even higher than the fair market value listed for real
estate tax purposes. Because the property was sold for
nonagricultural use, the taxpayers were assessed the
amount of taxes not assessed for the previous three years
because of the “Green Acres” designation. Because the
1995 fair market value for real estate tax purposes was
substantially higher than the Green Acres value, the
“payback” assessment was substantial. The taxpayers
argued that failure to provide the notice of new assessment
voided the new fair market value for real estate tax
purposes. The court held that the statute provided that the
failure to provide the notice did not affect the validity of
the new fair market value. In addition, the court noted that
the taxpayers had sufficient notice of the increased fair
market value to appeal the valuation. Ruberto v. County
of Washington, 572 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1997).
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